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The Nexus Between 
Salafism and Jihadism in 
the Netherlands
By Beatrice de Graaf
immediately after the 9/11 attacks, CNN 
displayed images from the Dutch city of 
Ede where groups of youth of Moroccan 
descent gleefully cheered and shouted 
over the apparent blow dealt to the 
United States. Two years later, Shaykh 
Fawaz Jneid, a well-known imam from 
a Salafist mosque in the Netherlands, 
cursed president George W. Bush, Ariel 
Sharon, Dutch parliamentarian Hirsi 
Ali and filmmaker Theo van Gogh and 
begged Allah “to destroy the enemies of 
Islam.”1 Another imam refused to shake 
hands with a Dutch female minister, 
and a third advised his followers to 
throw homosexuals from the roof.2 On 
November 2, 2004, two months after 
Fawaz had cursed Theo van Gogh, 
a young Dutch Muslim, Mohammed 
Bouyeri, murdered and slaughtered 
Van Gogh, quoting passages from the 
medieval Salafist cleric Ibn Taymiyya.3 
These incidents, and especially the 
terrorist attack committed by Bouyeri, 
brought the Salafist movement to 
the center of Dutch public outrage 
and debate, and prompted the Dutch 
Intelligence and Security Service 
(AIVD) to warn against the damaging 
influence of Salafist ideology on the 
Dutch Muslim community.4
An authoritative or exhaustive history 
of the emergence of Salafism in the 
Netherlands does not exist, nor has 
the Salafist population in the country 
been mapped out meticulously.5 To 
1 “Imam beticht van opruiing tegen Van Gogh,” NRC 
Handelsblad, October 31, 2006.
2   Jaco Alberts and Steven Derix, “Laveren tussen de wet 
en Allah,” NRC Handelsblad, September 19, 2005.
3   Ibid.
4  “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical-
isme in Nederland,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Ser-
vice, 2007; “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele trends en 
ontwikkelingen van het salafisme in Nederland,” Dutch 
Intelligence and Security Service, December 2009.
5  Salafism is a relatively new phenomenon in the Neth-
erlands. As a movement, it is very closed to the outside 
world. Therefore, the author does not pretend to give 
an in-depth analysis, but presents this article as a well-
informed snapshot of the present situation, taken in-
stead from a security studies’ point of view, rather than 
a theological or anthropological one. The first in-depth 
provide insight on this community, it 
is necessary to rely on reports by the 
Netherlands’ National Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism (NCTb) and the 
AIVD, newspaper clippings and the 
extensive field work of anthropologists 
and social scientists who carried out 
research projects among Salafist youths 
in the Netherlands in recent years.6 
Based on this information, this article 
will explain why Salafism7 gained 
popularity in the Netherlands, and then 
examine the three stages through which 
it has passed since the 9/11 attacks on 
the United States.
1986-2001: The Creation of a Salafist 
Infrastructure in the Netherlands
The Saudi non-governmental 
missionary organization al-Haramain 
was responsible for the creation of the 
El Tawheed Foundation in Amsterdam 
field study of the Salafist movement in the Netherlands 
is soon to be published, however: Ineke Roex, Sjef van 
Stiphout and Jean Tillie, Salafisme in Nederland. Aard, 
omvang en dreiging (Amsterdam: IMES, 2010). Another 
good overview is “Salafisme in Nederland: Een voorbi-
jgaand fenomeen of een blijvende factor van belang?” 
Netherlands’ National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
(NCTb), 2008. Also see Martijn de Koning, Zoeken naar 
een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van 
jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Amsterdam: Bert 
Bakker, 2008).
6  Most notably, Frank J. Buijs, Froukje Demant and 
Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem. Radicale en 
democratische moslims in Nederland (Amsterdam: Amster-
dam University Press, 2006) and De Koning, Zoeken naar 
een ‘zuivere’ islam.
7  Salafism is not a unified movement, as it displays 
various currents, historical trajectories and genealogies. 
Many Salafists are non-violent, and various strains are 
apolitical. Moreover, it is often used as a normative self-
descriptor, used by religious factions to claim religious 
and political legitimacy, than as an objectifying term. 
Salafists claim adherence to the first three generations 
of exemplary followers of the Prophet Muhammad. As 
Quintan Wiktorowicz has described in his seminal text 
from 2006, Salafists are united around the strict adher-
ence to the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God, or 
monotheism), the rejection of innovations (bid`a) of the 
Islamic creed and practice, the condemnation of polythe-
ism (shirk) and all other forms of venerating humans or 
objects. Salafists maintain that theirs is the only legiti-
mate interpretation of the Qur’an and sunna. To them, 
Islamic pluralism, let alone subjective individual inter-
pretation without being an accepted authority, does not 
exist. For an overview of Salafism, see Roel Meijer ed., 
Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: 
Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 1-32; Quintan Wiktorow-
icz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 29:3 (2006): pp. 207-239.
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in 1986 (led since the mid-1990s by the 
Egyptian imam Mahmoud Shershaby), 
thereby laying the foundations of the 
Salafist infrastructure in the Netherlands 
as a whole.8 Three years later, another 
Saudi private missionary organization 
with headquarters in Riyadh, al-
Waqf, initiated the establishment of 
the foundation al-Waqf al-Islami in 
Eindhoven. The al-Fourqaan mosque in 
Eindhoven, led by the Sudanese imam 
Eisha Bersham, became the center of 
this foundation’s activities. In 1990, 
also with Saudi support, the Foundation 
Sounna was created in The Hague (in 
1998 renamed as the Foundation As-
Soennah/Centrum Sheikh al-Islam Ibn 
Taymia), led by the Syrian imam Fawaz 
Jneid and preacher Jamal Ahajjaj (Abu 
Ismail), who both play an important part 
in the dissemination of Salafism in the 
Netherlands.9 The Foundation ISOOK10 
in Tilburg (led by the Syrian imam 
Ahmed Salaam) was created in 2000, 
through indirect assistance from Saudi 
Arabia. Salam is considered a highly 
educated cleric, who has published 
many religious works; Fawaz Jneid and 
Mahmoud Shershaby are said to be his 
pupils. 
Other organizations came into existence 
as well, such as the Foundation for 
Islamic Youths in Breda, founded 
in March 1990, or the al-Haramain 
Humanitarian Aid Amsterdam (which 
was dissolved in 2006). The Salafist 
movement, however, was still a minor 
current within the Muslim community 
in the Netherlands during this time 
period, according to an AIVD report 
from 1998.11 
The above-mentioned foundations and 
mosques in Amsterdam, Eindhoven, 
The Hague and Tilburg constitute the 
most prominent Salafist hubs in the 
Netherlands, drawing some 1,500 (As-
Soennah) or even 2,000 visitors (al-
Fourqaan) each Friday (of a population 
of about 850,000 Muslims in the 
Netherlands).12 In comparison with other 
8 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; De Koning,  Zoeken 
naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, pp. 373-377.
9  Ibid.
10  ISOOK stands for the Islamitische Stichting voor Op-
voeding en Overdracht van Kennis (Islamic Foundation 
for Education and Dissemination of Knowledge).
11 “De politieke islam in Nederland,” Dutch Intelligence 
and Security Service, 1998. 
12  NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.”
18
countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany or France, these Salafist 
groups became more popular and rooted 
within the Muslim communities than 
other related radical Islamist currents 
such as Hizb al-Tahrir (Hizb ut-Tahrir) 
or Takfir wal-Hijra.13 
The Salafist  mosques also mobil ize 
a  multinational  crowd of  visitors. 
Muslims from the Maghreb,  the Horn 
of  Africa,  Pakistan,  Afghanistan, 
Turkey,  the Middle  East  and Dutch 
converts  are  among the attendants. 14 
Although the Salafist  movement in 
general  consists  of  Saudi,  Egyptian 
or  Syrian members,  Dutch Moroccans 
constitute  the predominant  group, 
in  particular  Muslim youth of 
Moroccan descent  (40% of  the Dutch 
Moroccan population is  under 30). 15 
The Moroccan community was also 
responsible  for  the establishment 
of  the As-Soennah and al-Fourqaan 
mosques. 
2001-2002: Salafism as empowerment
In the Netherlands, Salafi-jihadism is a 
latecomer compared to the other Salafist 
communities in Europe, where political 
refugees from the Middle East and 
veterans from the wars in Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Chechnya imported militant 
experiences to the West as early as 
the late 1980s, such as in France and 
in the United Kingdom. From the late 
1990s, but especially after 9/11, these 
Salafist groups extended their religious 
infrastructure in the Netherlands: 
they built new mosques, websites and 
informal networks. Martijn de Koning 
discerns three groups among them: 
“Selefies,” politically involved Salafists 
13  Hizb al-Tahrir is a very hierarchical organization, but 
lacks infrastructure and cadre in the Netherlands. This 
can be explained by the absence of a large immigrant 
community from Pakistan or India in the Netherlands. 
The first activities of radical Salafist and jihadist groups 
in the Netherlands were initiated by immigrants from 
Algeria, Morocco or Syria, all countries where Hizb 
al-Tahrir is less active. Immigration history and coinci-
dence played a part in this.
14  NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.”
15  Ten percent of the immigrant population is Moroccan 
(approximately 345,000 in 2009), whereas the Turkish 
minority stands at 11%. See the Centraal Bureau voor 
de Statistiek located at http://statline.cbs.nl; V. van den 
Maagdenberg, “Jaarrapport Integratie,” in Onderzoek ver-
richt in opdracht van het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 
(SCP) (Rotterdam: Instituut voor Sociologisch-Econo-
misch Onderzoek, 2004), pp. 13-14.
and the jihadi/takfiri Salafists (or Salafi-
jihadists).16 
Selefies, as they label themselves, are the 
most apolitical, pious group, and claim 
to be non-violent. Their main preacher 
is Abdillah Bouchta, a Salafist teacher 
from Tilburg. The second group includes 
more politically-oriented Salafists who 
are non-violent as well, but engage more 
in local and international politics. This 
strand develops its mobilizing power 
through central nodes within the Muslim 
community, most of them financed 
or inspired by Saudi organizations.17 
A third, very marginal strand can be 
described as the jihadi/takfiri branch of 
Salafism, according to De Koning, and 
comprises a small number of Muslims, 
especially those connected to the former 
Hofstad Group.18
These groups differ, for example, 
regarding the status of Islamic clerics, 
attitudes toward parliamentary 
democracy and the desirability of the 
resurrection of a caliphate.19 Although 
the first two branches of Salafism 
are non-violent, they nevertheless 
imported theological  doctrines on 
the war against  infidels,  the search 
for  a  pure Islam and the tools  for  a 
radical  form of  Muslim empowerment 
to  the Netherlands.  These radical 
ideas grew in popularity  within the 
Muslim community after  2001,  when 
the so-called “Fortuyn-revolt”  in  the 
Netherlands gained momentum and 
started to attack “Muslim immigration.” 
The charismatic right-wing politician 
Pim Fortuyn and his effervescent 
populist party entered the political 
stage in August 2001 and linked Islam, 
immigration, integration and terrorism 
together, discursively framing them into 
a security issue, which of course made 
an impression immediately after 9/11. 
The Salafist movement in particular 
became the focus of political and 
public attention, since the Salafists—
with their emphasis on purity, hatred 
against “infidels” and revulsion against 
supposedly low moral standards in the 
West—posed the mirror image to the 
16 Martijn de Koning, “Changing Worldviews and 
Friendship: An Exploration of the Life Stories of Two 
Female Salafis in the Netherlands,” in Meijer, Global 
Salafism, pp. 408-410.
17  NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.”
18  De Koning, “Changing Worldviews,” p. 410.
19  Buijs et al.
Dutch defenders of national security, 
Western liberalism and secularization. 
Therefore, after years of benign neglect, 
Moroccans, Turks and other immigrants 
were now framed as “Muslims” and 
were held responsible for jihadist 
attacks elsewhere. The consequence of 
this application of religious frames of 
identity in mainstream Dutch discourse 
was that youth with Moroccan parents, 
but born and raised in the Netherlands, 
embraced this stigmatization and fell 
back on this new collective, post-ethnic 
Muslim identity. They adopted the 
same set of mechanisms that can be 
found within other youth cultures: they 
appropriated a negative identity that 
frightened and provoked the mainstream 
population by incorporating violent 
and dangerous symbols and discourses 
in their group identity.20 They adopted 
symbols and discourses from the Salafi-
jihadi movement since this provided 
them with the tools to transform 
themselves into superior and militant 
human beings with direct access to the 
“Truth.”21
From 2002-2003 onward, a small 
number of these alienated second-
generation immigrants of Moroccan 
descent entered the path of violent 
radicalization. Among them were the 
members of the so-called “Hofstad 
Group.”
2002-2004: Salafism as a Hotbed for 
Homegrown Jihadism22
In late 2001 to early 2002, the AIVD 
began monitoring Salafist centers, such 
as the al-Fourqaan mosque in Eindhoven 
that was suspected of recruiting young 
Muslims for the international jihad.23 In 
2002, two Dutch Moroccans were killed 
in Kashmir, Khalid el-Hasnoui and 
Ahmed el-Bakiouli, both supposedly 
20 Martijn de Koning, “Een wekelijks portie burger-
schap 8 – Wat meer radicalisering graag,” February 
22, 2010, available at www.religionresearch.org/mar-
tijn/2010/02/22/een-wekelijks-portie-burgerschap-8-
wat-meer-radicalisering-graag.
21  De Koning, “Changing Worldviews,” pp. 404-423.
22 This paragraph is partly based on the chapter “The 
Van Gogh Murder: A New Threat from Homegrown 
Terrorism in The Netherlands,” to be published in the 
forthcoming book, Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Rein-
ares, Leader-led Jihad (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010).
23  “OM: moskee Eindhoven werft strijders,” NRC Han-
delsblad, May 3, 2003.
mARCH 2010 . VoL 3 . IssUE 3
19
recruited in the al-Fourqaan mosque.24 
Months later, 13 individuals were 
arrested for terrorist activities, some 
of whom were regular visitors of al-
Fourqaan.25
 
Beginning in December 2001, the 
AIVD also monitored the radical 
Salafist El Tawheed mosque in the 
north of Amsterdam for suspicion of 
Egyptian and Saudi influences, since 
the mosque had financial relations to a 
Saudi non-governmental organization, 
al-Haramain International.26 In the 
summer of 2002, the service identified 
a group of Muslim youth, who met in 
and around the mosque and gathered 
around Redouan al-Issar (also named 
“Abu Khaled” or “the Shaykh”) who 
had ties to radical Muslims in Spain and 
Belgium.27 Abu Khaled was an illegal 
immigrant from Syria, a former member 
of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and 
a Takfir wal-Hijra adherent who came 
to the Netherlands in 1995.28 For a 
number of radical Muslims, he became 
a mentor.29 
He inspired, among others, 17-year-old 
high school student Samir Azzouz, of 
Moroccan origin but born and raised in 
the Netherlands.30 Samir Azzouz came 
24  Siem Eikelenboom, Jihad in de polder: De radicale islam 
in Nederland (Amsterdam: Veen, 2004), p. 63. 
25 Eikelenboom, Jihad in de polder; “Annual Report 
2002,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, 2003; 
“Saoedische invloeden in Nederland. Verbanden tussen 
salafistische missie. Radicaliseringsprocessen en isla-
mistisch terrorisme,” Dutch Intelligence and Security 
Service, June 2004.
26 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; “De omstreden El 
Tawheed-Moskee,” NOVA broadcast, November 9, 
2004. According to NOVA, Saudi businessman Aqeel 
Alaqeel financed the El Tawheed mosque with 1.3 mil-
lion euros. Al-Haramain was blacklisted as an al-Qa`ida 
charity, but the accusations were not substantiated and 
the mosque continued to operate. Thanks to Dennis de 
Widt for these references.
27 “Letter to Parliament,” Netherlands’ ministers of the 
interior and justice, Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, 
No. 5319045, November 10, 2004, pp. 20-24.
28  Ibid.
29 “Feitenrelaas,” attachment to the “Letter to Parlia-
ment,” Netherlands’ ministers of the interior and justice, 
Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, No. 29854, Novem-
ber 10, 2004.
30  For an account of this story, see “Samir A. First En-
emy of the State,” KRO Reporter, October 1, 2006. The 
documentary includes interviews with Azzouz and his 
wife. Also see Eric Vrijsen, “Van Samir A tot Marad J,” 
Elsevier, December 1, 2005; Arjan Erkel, Samir (Amster-
to the notice of the AIVD in January 
2003, when he took the train to Berlin, 
bound for Chechnya, to join local 
jihadists in their fight against Russian 
forces together with his friend Khalid 
(or Hussam, who was 17-years-old), 
but they were arrested and put back on 
a train to the Netherlands.31 After his 
return, Azzouz’s status rose; he started 
his own Islamic book company and 
began only associating with Moroccan 
youth.32 
Ismail Akhnikh was another Hofstad 
Group member with international 
aspirations. Akhnikh, born in 
Amsterdam in 1982 from Moroccan 
immigrants, regularly attended the El 
Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam where 
he became acquainted with Azzouz and 
helped to form the Hofstad Group in the 
fall of 2002.33 In the summer of 2003, 
he traveled with Azzouz to Barcelona 
to meet with Abdeladim Akoudad for 
guidance and instructions.34 Abdeladim 
Akoudad (or “Naoufel”), a Moroccan 
living in Spain, was suspected by 
the Moroccan security services of 
involvement in the Casablanca attacks 
of May 16, 2003.35 
After temporary arrests in October 
2003, Akhnikh, Azzouz and Jason 
Walters further developed their skills as 
jihadists and urged other Muslims to go 
abroad to wage jihad.36 Akhnikh went to 
Pakistan that year, as did “Zakaria T.” 
and Walters (who even went twice, in 
July and December 2003).37 Walters and 
dam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2007).
31  Ibid.
32  Ibid. 
33 “Verdict in the Hofstad-case,” Court of Rotterdam, 
The Hague, March 10, 2006. Also see Emerson Ver-
maat, De Hofstadgroep. Portret van een radicaal-islamitisch 
netwerk (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2005), pp. 55-77.
34  Ibid.
35  Petter Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker: Reli-
giously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name 
of Global Jihad? (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment, 2005), pp. 17-19. 
36 “Repliek van de officier van justitie in de strafzaken 
tegen Nadir A. etc.,” National Prosecutor’s Office (Lan-
delijk Parket), Amsterdam, February 6, 2005, pp. 7, 13.
37  “Dutch Radical Islamic Group Planned Euro 2004 
Attack in Portugal,” Agence France-Presse, November 
15, 2004; “Dutch Islamists Planned Barroso Attack,” Re-
uters, November 15, 2004; “Letter to Parliament,” Neth-
erlands’ minister of justice, November 10, 2004, Han-
delingen van de Tweede Kamer, 2004–2005. Also see 
the parliamentary debate on this report on November 11, 
Akhnikh even bragged about contacts 
with Maulana Masood Azhar, the 
founder of Jaysh-i-Muhammad, which 
they later downplayed in court—but no 
evidence of concrete preparations was 
found.38 
Then, on the early morning of November 
2, 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year-
old Dutch Moroccan, born and raised in 
Amsterdam, awaited publicist Theo van 
Gogh in an Amsterdam street, shot him 
off his bicycle and slaughtered him with 
a ritual knife in the street in front of 
many witnesses.39 Under the new Dutch 
anti-terrorism laws passed in August 
2004, Bouyeri was arrested and tried 
for murder with “terrorist intent.”40 
On July 26, 2005, he received a life 
sentence, without parole—unusually 
harsh in Dutch judicial history.41 
Bouyeri’s action took the security 
services by surprise. From 2002, 
the AIVD had monitored a group of 
jihadist radicals with whom Bouyeri 
was acquainted, a network the service 
internally dubbed as the “Hofstad 
Group” since it operated in the nation’s 
capital, Amsterdam (Hofstad translates 
as “capital city”).42 Its core members 
were under surveillance, but Bouyeri 
did not belong to them. He did not take 
part in the foreign trips some of the 
members made and was not considered a 
2004, Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, 2004–2005.
38  Ibid.
39 A highly informative account of the assassination of 
Van Gogh and the development of the Hofstad Group can 
be found in: Albert Benschop, “Jihad in the Netherlands. 
Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold,” available at 
www.sociosite.org/jihad_nl_en.php.
40  See the verdict against Bouyeri, Court of Amsterdam, 
July 26, 2005.
41 In the Netherlands, life sentences are rare. Bouyeri 
was the 28th person to receive such a sentence since 1945, 
war criminals included. Capital felonies, such as murder, 
usually result in sentences of 10-15 years. The new terror-
ism law, however, states that if there is a terrorist motive 
for a crime, the sentence can be increased by half. Impris-
onments ordinarily in excess of 15 years can be upgraded 
to life imprisonment, as was the case with Bouyeri. 
42  Description of this case is based, among others, on the 
requisitory of the National Prosecution in the Hofstad 
Group case. See “Requisitoir van de officier van Justitie,” 
part I, National Prosecutor’s Office, January 23, 2006 
and part II, January 25, 2006; District Court of Rotter-
dam, verdict in the Hofstad Group case, March 10, 2006; 
“The ‘Hofstadgroep,’” working paper, Transnational 
Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, April 2008.
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main actor in the Dutch jihadist scene.43 
Bouyeri’s radical texts calling for 
violent jihad, disseminated under the 
name “Abu Zubair,” were only noticed 
after the police and the AIVD stepped 
up their investigation into the Hofstad 
Group after the murder of Van Gogh on 
November 2, 2004.44
After the attack, it became clear that 
Bouyeri sought legitimacy for his 
atrocity in religious arguments. With 
him, he had a farewell letter titled 
“Drenched in Blood.” This versed text 
read as an incitement to holy war and 
was signed Saifu Deen al-Muwahhied. 
According to Ruud Peters, a Dutch Islam 
expert and witness for the prosecution, 
this alias was a combination of two 
Arabic terms—“sword of religion” 
(Saif al-Din) and “confessor of Tawhid” 
(al-Muwahhid).45 In the “open letter,” 
Bouyeri directly threatened Dutch-
Somali liberal politician Hirsi Ali, and 
blamed politicians for allowing Jewish 
influences in politics. According to 
Norwegian researcher Petter Nesser, 
the conclusion of the letter shows “the 
essence of ‘al-Qaidaism,’” by foreseeing 
the defeat of the enemy on the individual, 
local, regional and global levels in order 
of priority:
And like a great prophet once said: 
“I deem thee lost, O Pharaoh.” 
(17:102) And so we want to use 
similar words and send these 
before us, so that the heavens and 
the stars will gather this news and 
spread it over the corners of the 
universe like a tidal wave. “I deem 
thee lost, O America.” “I deem 
thee lost, O Europe.” “I deem thee 
lost, O Holland.” “I deem thee lost, 
43 The Review Committee on the Intelligence and Secu-
rity Services officially established in March 2008 that 
this had been a serious intelligence failure, as evidence 
surfaced prior to the attack that Bouyeri was at least affil-
iated with Dutch jihadist groups. See “Toezichtsrapport 
inzake de afwegingsprocessen van de AIVD met betrek-
king tot Mohammed B.,” Commissie van Toezicht betref-
fende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (CTIVD), 
March 2008. 
44  Siem Eikelenboom, Niet bang om te sterven: Dertig jaar 
terrorisme in Nederland (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 
2007), pp. 23-27; “Repliek van de officier van justitie in 
de strafzaken tegen Nadir A. etc.,” National Prosecutor’s 
Office (Landelijk Parket), Amsterdam, February 6, 2005, 
pp. 4-5, 9-10, 17-23.
45  “Repliek van de officier van justitie in de strafzaken 
tegen Nadir A. etc.,” pp. 4-5.
O Hirshi Ali.” “I deem thee lost, O 
unbelieving fundamentalist.”46
These two texts showed that Bouyeri’s 
attack was the outcome of an ideological 
turn to violent jihad that evolved from 
the Hofstad Group, since Bouyeri wrote 
these texts in spiritual support for 
this network.47 In one of Bouyeri’s last 
writings, an “Open Letter to the Dutch 
Population” dated August 12, 2004 
(which he left on a USB-stick for other 
Hofstad Group members to disseminate 
within “the umma”),48 he announced 
attacks against Dutch public places, 
justifying them due to the support of 
the Dutch government for the United 
States and Israel. His argument echoed 
a fatwa announced by dissident Saudi 
Shaykh Hamud Ibn `Uqla al-Shu’aybi, 
legitimizing the September 11 attacks.49 
A translation of this fatwa was found 
on computers of other Hofstad Group 
members.50 
Bouyeri and the Hofstad Group drew 
inspiration from several Salafist 
sources. They took the principle of al-
wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) 
from the Salafist cleric Abu Muhammad 
al-Maqdisi, which dictates that true 
jihadists should isolate themselves from 
the non-Muslim world and hate those 
who threaten Islam.51 From the London-
based Salafist imam Abu Hamza al-
Masri, they took the principle of takfir 
(declaring fellow Muslims infidels).52 
46  Nesser, p. 25.
47  “Requisitoir van de officier van Justitie.”
48  “Repliek van de officier van justitie in de strafzaken 
tegen Nadir A. etc.,” pp. 31-32.
49  A biography of this shaykh is available on a web-
site called “Marokko Community,” in which references 
to the September 11 fatwa are found. For the biography, 
see “Sheikh Hamoud bin Uqla as-Shu’aybi: De leven-
sloop van een groot geleerde,” July 24, 2008, available at 
www.forums.marokko.nl/showthread.php?t=2092457.
Al-Shu’aybi’s fatwa in English can be found at www.
tawhed.net/a.php?a=hmodUkla.
50  “Requisitoir van de officier van Justitie.”
51  Al-Maqdisi has revolutionized this theme in Salafi-
jihadism. For details, see Joas Wagemakers, “A Purist 
Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maq-
disi,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36:2 (2009): 
pp. 287-297; Joas Wagemakers, “Framing the ‘Threat 
to Islam’: al-wala’ wa al-bara’ in Salafi Discourse,” Arab 
Studies Quarterly 30:4 (2008): pp. 1-22; Joas Wagemak-
ers, “Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: A Counter-Terrorism 
Asset?” CTC Sentinel 1:6 (2008): pp. 7-9.
52  De Koning, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, p. 374; See 
also R. Peters, “De religieuze en ideologische ontwik-
Finally, it is argued that Bouyeri acted 
in line with Fawaz Jneid’s malediction 
of Theo van Gogh and Hirsi Ali.53
After these connections became public, 
the whole Salafist movement was put on 
trial in the eyes of the Dutch population. 
The members of the Hofstad Group had 
been visitors of the As-Soennah and El 
Tawheed mosques in The Hague and 
Amsterdam.54 The al-Fourqaan mosque 
in Eindhoven was accused of recruitment 
activities and radical Salafist imams had 
on many occasions lashed out against the 
Netherlands, homosexuals and liberal 
intellectuals such as Hirsi Ali or Theo van 
Gogh.55 In the perception of large parts 
of the Dutch population, the November 
attack showed that every orthodox 
Muslim could be a potential terrorist,56 
and opinion polls said that 80% of the 
population wanted “tougher policies 
against immigrants.”57 Jihadist terrorism 
became a public nightmare. In 2005, the 
Dutch population listed it as the most 
important issue facing the country.58
2004-2010: Salafist Resilience Against 
Jihadists
After the murder of Van Gogh and 
the public outrage that followed suit, 
a process of reorientation seemed to 
set in within the Salafist movement 
in the Netherlands, partly due to the 
increased monitoring and control 
activities conducted against them 
keling van Mohammed Bouyeri. Deskundigenrapport 
opgesteld op verzoek van het Openbaar Ministerie voor 
de Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam,” May 2005; 
R. Peters, “Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald 
door Mohammed B,” attachment to the report mentioned 
above.
53 “Imam beticht van opruiing tegen Van Gogh.”
54 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.”
55  Ibid.
56 Ron Eyerman, The Assassination of Theo van Gogh. 
From Social Drama to Cultural Trauma (Durham/London: 
Duke University Press, 2008), p. 11. In reality, research 
revealed that probably less than 2 % of the Dutch Muslim 
population of Amsterdam was susceptible for “radical-
ization.” See Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie, Processen 
van radicalisering: Waarom sommige Amsterdamse moslims 
radicaal worden (Amsterdam: IMES, 2006).
57  Justin Sparks, “Muslim Mole Panics Dutch Secret 
Service,” Times, November 14, 2004.
58 “Kwantitatief onderzoek risicobeleving terrorisme 
2008,” Netherlands’ National Coordinator for Counter-
terrorism & Netherlands’ Government Information Ser-
vice, September 2008, p. 5. Fear of terrorism was men-
tioned spontaneously by 40% of the respondents. The 
economy ranked second with 25%.
mARCH 2010 . VoL 3 . IssUE 3
21
by the security services and local 
authorities. In February 2005, Minister 
for Immigration and Integration Rita 
Verdonk, for example, declared three 
imams from the al-Fourqaan mosque 
in Eindhoven as unwanted aliens, and 
started procedures to expel them from 
the country.59 These more repressive 
measures were flanked by other central 
and local deradicalization programs, 
directed against so-called “hotbeds of 
radicalization.”60
Consequently, due to these forms of 
external pressure, Muslim resilience 
against jihadism increased.61 
Immediately after the murder of Van 
Gogh, various Salafist leaders warned 
their followers against interpreting 
radical texts without consulting 
clerics.62 In 2005, it was revealed that 
the Amsterdam imam Fawaz had urged 
some young Muslim women that were 
under the influence of the Hofstad Group 
to report to the police.63 As a result of 
their statements, the case against the 
Hofstad Group in 2005-2006 became 
stronger. Moreover, in 2006 the Islamic 
Foundation for Culture and Welfare in 
Tilburg, headed by the apolitical Selefie 
imam Bouchta, published a booklet in 
which it condemned suicide attacks, 
warned against preachers of hate and 
accused Salafists who turned to violence 
of sinful aberrations.64  
Indeed, Salafist leaders such as Fawaz 
realized that jihadist activities such 
as the murder of Van Gogh could 
only backfire against Muslims in the 
Netherlands. His warnings against 
the takfiri-ideology of Bouyeri and the 
other members of the Hofstad Group 
were, however, not only inspired by 
strategic musings; to some Salafist 
clerics, individual takfiri-activities are a 
59  NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; “Ook tweede Eind-
hovense imam terecht uitgezet,” Algemeen Nederlands 
Persbureau, October 10, 2007.
60 “Lokale en justitiële aanpak van radicalisme en 
radicalisering,” Kamerstukken 2004–2006 29754 No. 
5; “Actieplan polarisatie en radicalisering 2007-2011,” 
Netherlands’ Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Rela-
tions, August 2007.
61  “Saoedische invloeden in Nederland. Verbanden tus-
sen salafistische missie. Radicaliseringsprocessen en is-
lamistisch terrorisme.”
62  De Koning, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, p. 372.
63  Alberts et al.
64  “Folderen in strijd tegen aanslagen,” Brabants Dag-
blad, June 10, 2006.
real danger and an aberration from Islam 
since they ignite fitna (chaos and sedition) 
within the Muslim community itself.65 
In 2007, the AIVD signaled that more 
unity had been achieved among the 
different Salafist branches, among 
which the strand of political, non-violent 
Salafism was gaining the upper hand.66 
The NCTb underlined this estimate and 
identified trends of moderation and 
adaptation to the outside world. The 
increasing resilience against jihadist-
thinking within the Salafist movement 
was supported by a decreasing fear 
of homegrown terrorism within the 
broader Dutch society that felt more 
at ease since there had been no further 
jihadist attacks since November 2004 
and no other substantial homegrown 
networks uncovered.67 
In its 2008 annual report (published 
in April 2009), the AIVD concluded 
that “the terrorist threat increasingly 
emanates from transnational and 
local networks with an international 
orientation, but less from local-
autonomous networks.”68 Activities 
of “homegrown” radicals and their 
networks had been effectively 
disrupted.69 In December 2009, the 
level of security alertness regarding 
terrorism was therefore lowered from 
“substantial” to “restricted” since 
terrorist attacks against the Netherlands 
no longer seemed imminent.70
Radicalization of Moroccan youth is 
still taking place, according to the 
AIVD, certainly if compared to the 
Turkish community.71 These young 
65  To these clerics, takfir can only be pronounced by 
qualified religious authorities under special and restrict-
ed circumstances. See Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi 
Salafis or Revolutionaries: On Religion and Politics in the 
Study of Islamist Militancy,” in Meijer, Global Salafism, 
pp. 244-266.
66  “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical-
isme in Nederland.”
67  “The ‘Hofstadgroep,’” p. 16; “Annual Report 2006,” 
Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, 2007, p. 33.
68   “Annual Report 2008,” Dutch Intelligence and Secu-
rity Service, 2009, pp. 20-22.
69  Ibid.
70  “Letter to Parliament with the  Eleventh Counterter-
rorism Progress Report,” Netherlands’ National Coordi-
nator for Counterterrorism, December 15, 2009.
71  Regarding the Turkish community, social resilience 
against radicalization is traditionally higher because of 
the moderating influence of Islamist organizations such 
Muslims meet on the internet or during 
sermons of traveling youth preachers, 
and they translate and exchange jihadist 
texts.72 Radicalization has remained 
marginal, however, and should be viewed 
more as part of a radical Islamist youth 
counterculture and a way of expressing 
identity within the Dutch context. 
Moreover, the service noticed that Dutch 
Moroccan Muslims increasingly found 
ways of articulating their grievances 
and frustrations through democratic and 
activist channels. The anti-Islam movies of 
right-wing parliamentarian Geert Wilders 
(Fitna, 2008) and the politician/publicist 
Ehsan Jami (An Interview with Mohammed, 
2008) attracted a weaker response from 
the Muslim community than anticipated. 
Additionally, the Israeli bombing of Gaza 
in December 2008 to January 2009 led 
to a number of non-violent initiatives. 
Within the Dutch Salafist milieu, the 
AIVD therefore noted a “self-cleansing 
power” and an increased resilience against 
(violent) radical tendencies within the 
Muslim community.73 
Conclusion
After 2001, the orthodox Salafist creed 
gained popularity because it offered 
alienated Dutch youth of Moroccan 
descent a critical perspective of 
their own society. It enabled them to 
identify with the umma and suffering of 
Muslims elsewhere (in Iraq, Chechnya 
or Palestine), whose plight, in their 
view, mirrored their own discriminated 
position in the Netherlands. Salafism 
provided youths who felt caught 
between their traditionalist parents 
and the modern, secularized Dutch 
society a clear set of beliefs and a means 
of (re)gaining pride and self-esteem.74 
as Diyanet and Milli Görüs and the impact of Turkish 
nationalism. In its annual report in 2007, the AIVD did, 
however, signal that some youths were trying to shirk 
away from their tight community and were radicalizing 
on their own account, through the internet. No news 
of violent activism perpetrated by radical Islamist or 
Salafist Turkish youths has yet come to light. See “An-
nual Report 2007,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Ser-
vice, 2008.
72   NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.”
73 “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele trends en ontwik-
kelingen van het salafisme in Nederland.” Also see A. 
Olgun, “Nuance keert terug in Nederland,” NRC Handels-
blad, February 13, 2008; “Bijna 3000 digitale knuffels 
voor PVV-voorman Wilders,” Metro, January 30, 2008; 
Bas Heijne, “Waarom ik Geert Wilders dankbaar ben,” 
NRC Handelsblad, January 26, 2008.
74  Buijs et al., pp. 228-231.
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Only a tiny group among them went a 
step further, embracing the lifestyle 
and symbols of jihadists abroad as the 
only answer to their perceived sense of 
injustice and insecurity, and even put 
them into practice in the Netherlands.75 
The members of the Hofstad Group 
legitimized their terrorist intentions with 
thoughts they took from notable Salafi-
jihadi clerics such as Abu Hamza al-Masri 
or Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.
This still does not solidify a causal 
relationship. Salafist mosques did 
indeed function as an ideological hotbed 
for potential radicals. The al-Fourqaan 
mosque in Eindhoven was identified 
as a playground for jihadist recruiters. 
The members of the Hofstad Group, 
however, were not passive victims of 
Salafist “hatemongers” from abroad. 
On the contrary, militant Muslims such 
as Samir Azzouz, Jason Walters or 
Mohammed Bouyeri were actively seeking 
jihadist guidance once they had embarked 
on their course of radicalization. At some 
point, they even stopped visiting their 
Salafist mosques because it did not offer 
them instructions to wage jihad in the 
Netherlands. They therefore constructed 
their own brand of umma-oriented 
jihadism through texts and principles 
they found on the internet.
Indeed, the AIVD defined Salafism 
as “anti-integrative, anti-democratic 
and isolationist” in 2007 and again in 
2009.76 This definition, however, cannot 
be equated with terrorism. Salafism 
is not a sliding scale from passive 
orthodoxy into violent orthopraxy. 
On the contrary, from 2005 onward, 
Salafist imams, including Fawaz Jneid, 
have tried to put a brake on overly 
enthusiastic jihadist emotions among 
Muslim youth by steering them into 
more apolitical and especially non-
violent action modes and sometimes 
even reported them to the police.77 
75  Kees van den Bos, Annermarie Loseman and Bertjan 
Doosje, Waarom jongeren radicaliseren en sympathie krijgen 
voor terrorisme: Onrechtvaardigheid, onzekerheid en be-
dreigde groepen (The Hague: WODC, 2009).
76  “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical-
isme in Nederland”; “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele 
trends en ontwikkelingen van het salafisme in Neder-
land.” Also see Hans Moors and Menno Jacobs, Aan de 
hand van de imam. Integratie en participatie van orthodoxe 
moslims in Tilburg-Noord (Tilburg: IVA beleidsonderzoek 
en advies, 2009).
77  Buijs et al.; Alberts et al.
In sum, the Salafist movement in the 
Netherlands is still controversial. 
The strand of political Salafism 
remains responsible for anti-Western, 
isolationist and radical opinions; 
however, as stated by De Koning, 
political Salafists and apolitical Selefies 
hold a different view on violence and 
attitudes toward “infidels” compared 
to the jihadists. Salafist criticism of the 
war in Afghanistan or the exploitation 
of women in Western media and society 
should not be equated to terrorism, 
but could be viewed as the voice of a 
group of highly critical and religious 
citizens that are searching for a self-
conscious position within Dutch 
society.78 Moreover, both the NCTb and 
the AIVD signal a trend of adaptation 
and moderation (inspired by external 
pressure from Dutch security services 
and local authorities as well as from 
the Saudi regime) of Salafist excesses 
and a growing resilience and resistance 
against the seeds of violent jihadism.79  
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